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THE EFFECTS TEST: NEW DIRECTIONS
David C. Hsia*
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' prohibits employ-
ment practices which discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.2 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 3
the United States Supreme Court held that a facially neutral
employment practice having a disparate impact on a protected
class may violate Title VII even though the employer did not
actually intend to discriminate. This technique of measuring
employment discrimination by disparate impact rather than
improper intention is commonly known as the effects test.4
Recent judicial developments have given rise to doubt as
to the continued viability of the effects test.' Such doubt is
premature. Although the Supreme Court has curtailed its po-
tential use as a constitutional standard in the employment
discrimination field, its basic Title VII coverage and content
remain unchanged. Simultaneously, judicial and legislative
authorities are initiating use of the effects test to combat dis-
crimination in such areas as credit and housing, signalling,
perhaps, that the test can be expected to grow and develop.
Anticipating further development, this article focuses on
the effects test as first articulated in Griggs and subsequently
applied in Title VII class actions. Using employment discrimi-
nation as a prototype, it then explores the projected scope of
effects test applications in new fields.
* Staff Attorney, Division of Consumer Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; member, Illinois, District of Columbia Bars. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the
Board of Governors or its staff.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title VII]. Title
VII was enacted in 1964, see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253,
and amended extensively in 1972, see Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
3. 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
4. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 155 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Oelsner, New Trend in Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1977, at
36, col. 5.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: THE EFFECTS TEST UNDER TITLE
VII
The Context: Class Actions
Title VII provides that it shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment.6 While discrimination is not defined in Title
VII, the effects test or disparate impact theory is one way of
establishing its existence.7 When using the effects test, the
plaintiff seeks to show that an employment practice which is
neutral in appearance actually has a discriminatory impact
upon a protected class. The plaintiff representing the protected
class need not prove that a discriminatory purpose motivated
the practice.' A showing of discriminatiory effect, standing
alone, establishes a prima facie case of unlawful discrimina-
tion, shifting to the employer the burden of justifying the chal-
lenged employment practice on a nondiscriminatory basis.9
The disparate impact theory appears in class actions alleg-
ing employment discrimination. It is not suited to private, in-
dividual actions based on a personalized grievance. I This type
6. See notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text supra.
7. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1 (1976). See
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 428-32 (1971); Carey v. Greyhound Bus Co., 500 F.2d 1372, 1375 (5th Cir.
1974).
Some courts demonstrate confusion about whether the effects test is a rule estab-
lishing the order of proof, a rule establishing the burden of persuasion, a rule of
construction for Title VII, or a means of constitutional interpretation.
Were the effects test to prescribe a rigid, shifting order of proof, see, e.g., James
v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 394 F. Supp. 434 (D. Ala. 1975), Title VII suits
would essentially be operating under different rules of procedure than all other civil
actions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
Other courts persist in using the effects, test as constituting a new allocation of
the burden of persuasion. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1976);
Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1226, 1231 (6th Cir. 1976); United Transp. Union Local
974 v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 532 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
934 (1976).
Finally, courts have used the effects test as a means of constitutional interpreta-
tion. E.g., Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229
(1976). It is now settled that the test is not a rule of constitutional law. See notes 46-
62 and accompanying text infra.
8. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 n.15
(1977).
9. See id. at 1886 & n.45; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975).
10. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). But cf.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 n.15 (1977)
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of action is more typically brought under the disparate treat-
ment theory of discrimination." Under this theory the issue is
whether or not a particular employment decision was moti-
vated by a discriminatory purpose. In an individual action, as
contrasted with a class suit, proof of an illicit purpose behind
an employment practice is critical to recovery. 2
In order to understand how the effects test applies to dis-
crimination in areas of the law other than employment, it is
necessary to initially focus on its elements as used to interpret
Title VII.
The Analysis: A Three Step Process
Despite numerous Title VII cases using and interpreting
the effects test, no opinion has comprehensively stated the dis-
parate impact theory. Courts agree that an employer's good or
bad faith is irrelevant to show that a challenged practice does
or does not unlawfully discriminate against a protected class. 3
All courts focus on discriminatory results. However, opinions
do not closely examine the separate elements comprising the
theory.
Review of the sequence of Supreme Court cases following
Griggs shows that the effects test consists of a three step pro-
cess which may be stated as follows:
(both the disparate treatment and the disparate impact theories may be applied to a
particular set of facts simultaneously).
11. Disparate treatment means that an employer treats members of a protected
class less favorably than others similarly situated because of the individual's race,
color, sex, or national origin. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S.
Ct. 1843, 1854 n. 15 (1977). See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59, 67,
69-70 (1972). The leading case is McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
12. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 n.15
(1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). However, illicit pur-
pose may be proven by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence. If an individual
employment decision adversely affecting an individual plaintiff conforms to a pattern
or practice having a disparate impact upon a protected class, the showing of disparate
impact permits an inference that the particular employment decision at issue was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 97 S.Ct. at 1854 n.15; Blumrosen, supra note
11, at 69. Thus, in a disparate treatment case, disparate impact is relevant only in an
evidentiary sense. It does not have the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to
the employer to show that the decision was not discriminatory.
13. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 587 (2d
Cir. 1976).14. Chronologically, the Supreme Court opinions refining Griggs are: McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
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1) The plaintiff-class bears the initial burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case.' 5 To do so, it must show that an
employment practice has a discriminatory effect on a pro-
tected class.'"
2) The employer may rebut the prima facie case by show-
ing that the employment practice has a manifest relation-
ship to the job in question.'7
3) It remains open to the plaintiff-class to show that
there is an alternative employment practice available
which would have a less discriminatory effect on the pro-
tected class and which serves the employer's legitimate
needs at least as well as the disputed practice."
When the criteria of a step is fulfilled, the burden of proof
shifts to the other party.'9 Each of these steps warrants sepa-
rate discussion.
The prima facie case. The effects test was first formulated
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.2" In that opinion the Supreme
Court stated that an aggrieved plaintiff-class must initially
show that an employment practice used by a defendant-
employer has the effect of discriminating against a protected
class. No showing of discriminatory intent by the employer in
adopting the practice is necessary.2' The Court focused solely
405 (1975); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843
(1977).
15. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1866
(1977).
16. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
17. Id.; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
18. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
19. See, e.g., Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1976); Senter v.
General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976); United Transp. Union Local 974
v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 532 F.2d 336 (4th-Cir. 1975).
20. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs presented the Court with an employment policy
requiring candidates for transfer to skilled job lines to either have a high school educa-
tion or pass a standardized intelligence test. Id. at 427-28. The plaintiff made no
showing of discriminatory purpose on the part of the employer in adopting these
requirements. However, the employer had practiced overt discrimination in the period
prior to the enactment of Title VII and the educational requirement, which had the
effect of perpetuating the prior discrimination by impeding transfers of minority em-
ployees to better paying job lines, had been instituted on the very day Title VII became
effective. The Court therefore found that the employer's policy unlawfully discrimi-
nated under Title VII. Id. at 431.
21. The Court asserted in Griggs: "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures . . . that operate as 'built-in head-
winds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability. . . . Con-
gress directed the thrust of tHe Act to the consequences of employment practices, not
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on the disparate impact of the challenged practice, observing
that Congress directed the thrust of Title VII to the conse-
quences of employment practices and not simply to the motiva-
tion .22
Discrimination takes many forms, and both the Supreme
Court and lower courts recognize that evidence of dispropor-
tionate impact cannot be the same in every case.23 Thus, all
manner of fact patterns have been accepted as probative on the
issue of discriminatory effect.24
When proceeding under the disparate impact theory, how-
ever, the plaintiff-class must direct its charges of discrimina-
tion to specific employment practices. Mere allegations of dis-
proportionate employment results are insufficient.25 Title VII
expressly refers to unlawful employment practices rather than
to consequences alone.26 The prima facie case under the effects
test requires an employment pattern or practice. This means a
series of similar actions and not simply an isolated employment
decision. A single incident is probably not actionable under the
effects test. 27
A curious corollary to the requirement of an employment
pattern or practice is that any given member of the class need
only demonstrate an indirect nexus between himself and the
simply the motivation." Id. at 432 (emphasis in the original).
The employer's intent is only irrelevant to a suit using the effects test. Bad intent
remains the principal element of proof when proceeding under other theories of dis-
crimination. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)(constitutional intent);
Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1973)(Title VII intent).
22. See note 21 supra.
23. Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 797, 802 n.13 (1973)(evi-
dence of disparate treatment).
24. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (racially
disproportionate impact held proved by statistical analysis of applicants' addresses
and probable race of persons residing in each census tract).
25. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77, 94 (5th Cir. 1976).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
27. Even if an employment practice can be isolated for judicial scrutiny in
connection with a single refusal to hire, promote, or transfer, this generally does not
constitute a disproportionate effect upon a protected class. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976); Miller v. Bank of America, 418
F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The discrimination is potential rather than actual. But
cf. Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 380 F. Supp. 228, 233 (N.D. Ohio
1974) (Title VIII). Most Title VII cases using the effects test rely upon a series of actions
by the employer to establish a prima facie case of unequal impact. Griggs and Moody
both involved systematic denials of transfers. Accord, Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d
474 (10th Cir. 1976); Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 97 S. Ct. 1891 (1977); Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d
300 (5th Cir. 1973).
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challenged practice in order to have standing to sue.2" The indi-
vidual need only show that he is a member of the protected
class, and that an unlawful employment decision affected him
adversely. However, this employment decision need not be of
the same type as the practices directly challenged in the law
suit. This approach may derive from the view that employment
discrimination is often subtle and difficult to prove.2"
Employer's rebuttal. Once the plaintiff-class has estab-
lished its prima facie case, the burden of persuasion shifts to
the defendant-employer, who must then justify the disparate
impact by showing a manifest relationship between the ques-
tioned employment practice and the employer's legitimate job-
related interests.30
Manifest relationship is a term of art in employment dis-
crimination shrouded with vagueness. 3' The problem of pre-
cisely defining the term has yet to be addressed by the courts.
Generally, it requires that an employment practice be a busi-
ness necessity, or be job related.32 Title VII cases have classified
28. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d
169 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976);
Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1975); cf. Harrison v. Otto
G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 414 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (a complainant need
only demonstrate that he was denied housing opportunities on the basis of racial
considerations, whether or not he was a direct object of discrimination).
29. Cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977) (housing discrimination).
30. The Court in Griggs determined that "Congress has placed on the employer
the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship
to the employment in question." 401 U.S. at 432.
31. Possible characteristics of manifest relationship to employment which are
mentioned in Griggs include "genuine business need," "job capability," and
"successful job performance." Id. at 431.
32. To establish manifest relationship, the employer must demonstrate a legiti-
mate business reason for having the challenged practice. "The touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431 (empha-
sis added).
This business necessity doctrine, first enunciated in Griggs, has been subsequently
interpreted to mean that employers must go as far as possible to remedy discriminatory
effects. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1297 (8th Cir. 1975); Rodriguez v.
East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 56 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 97
S.Ct. 1891 (1977); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116
(1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed under
Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). Employers must use practices which have the least
possible discriminatory effect. The business purpose justifying a policy having a dis-
proportionate effect must be "sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact."
Id. Mere business convenience has not been found compelling. Watkins v. Scott Paper
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certain employment practices as job related and others as not
job related, but have not offered consistent reasons for their
classifications.
Though job relatedness must be judged in the context of
the circumstances of a particular case, intelligence tests and
departmental seniority systems have not often been held to be
manifestly related,33 while dismissals of disruptive workers
have been upheld as job related. 4 Additional authority on what
showings constitute a manifest relationship may be drawn from
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidelines, which suggest that it can be established by demon-
strating a significant correlation between the employment
practice and "important elements of work behavior which com-
prise or are relevant to the job."35
Less discriminatory alternatives. If the employer rebuts
the prima facie case, the plaintiff-class may still prove effects
test discrimination by proffering an alternative employment
practice which is less discriminatory and which serves the em-
ployer's legitimate business needs at least as well as the present
employment practice. Although this has been clearly articu-
Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1181 (5th Cir. 1976); Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 101 (1974);
Letter from Roger S. Kuhn to the Federal Reserve Board (Oct. 1, 1976) (Log. No. EC-
532).
33. See, e.g., Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1976) (seniority);
Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975)
(testing), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1861-62 (1977)(seniority system fails under Griggs stan-
dards, but is otherwise immunized from attack by separate Title VII provision).
34. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Hochstadt v.
Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1976), cited with approval in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430 (1975).
36. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). In Albemarle, the
employer required a high school diploma and a passing score on two intelligence tests
in order to transfer to skilled lines of job progression. The employer also had a policy
of accruing seniority only within job lines. The plaintiff demonstrated that there had
been past discrimination and that the transfer policy had the effect of discriminating
against a protected class. The employer countered with a serious attempt to prove by
industrial studies that the transfer requirements were in fact related to job perform-
ance. The Court stated the third step to the test, but did not discuss its applicability
to the facts in dispute, saying: "If an employer does then meet the burden of proving
that its tests are 'job related,' it remains open to the complaining party to show that
other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also
serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship."'
Id. at 425. See Note, supra note 32, at 113. Thus, Albemarle established that the
burden of persuasion in the third step of the effects test is on the complainant. Presum-
ably the defendant can rebut this final showing only by contesting the elements consti-
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lated as a separate third step in the effects test, no appellate
case has yet reached this stage of analysis on its facts. Accord-
ingly, it is unclear just how much less discriminatory a sug-
gested alternative employment practice must be in order to
result in a finding of unlawful discrimination. 7
At least two possible approaches, each incorporating con-
cepts from earlier steps of disparate impact analysis, are avail-
able for adoption.
One approach derives from the prima facie case's attention
to the role of statistics in establishing disparate impact. Under
this standard, the plaintiff-class must propose an alternative
employment practice which both serves the legitimate needs of
the employer and has a significantly less discriminatory impact
upon the protected class, meaning that the proposed alterna-
tive must confer a substantial reduction in discrimination
when compared to the existing practice. A marginal improve-
ment in discrimination reduction is insufficient. 8
tuting the plaintiff's proof. Albemarle does not provide for any independent showing
on a new argument by the defendant.
Curiously, the Albemarle Court cited the EEOC testing guidelines with approval,
29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(3) & (4), notwithstanding that the guidelines appear elsewhere
to allocate the burden in the third step to the employer. The guidelines require a person
using an employment test to be able to demonstrate that "alternative suitable hiring,
transfer or promotion procedures are unavailable for his use." Id. § 1607.3 (1974).
37. Given the threat of a backpay award, the degree of proof becomes very
important. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 423 (1975); Com-
ment, Backpay for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII-Role of the Judiciary
in Exercising Its Discretion, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 525 (1974); Note, Of Storks and Foxes:
Employment Testing and Back Pay, 34 MD. L. Rv. 383 (1974); Comment, Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity: The Back Pay Remedy Under Title VII, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 379.
38. Statistical data might well be relied on to demonstrate that an alternative
practice would be significantly less discriminatory. To conduct a basic statistical anal-
ysis of disparate impact, the variables which result from the challenged practice-for
example, the percentage of applicants hired who belong to protected classes and the
hiring rate for applicants who are not members of protected classes-are selected and
compared. If they differ, there is a possibility of effects test discrimination.
The courts, however, have properly refused to find discrimination merely because
corresponding variables have differed. A finding of discrimination requires that the
disparities be "statistically significant," a mathematical term of art. Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430 (1975); accord, United States v. Elevator Constructors
Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511
(6th Cir. 1976); Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1976); Dorsano,
Statistical Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation: Selection of the Avail-
able Population, Problems, and Proposals, 29 Sw. L.J. 859 (1975); Note, Beyond the
Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal,
89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975); Note, Evidence: Statistical Proof in Employment Dis-
crimination Cases, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 885 (1975). Suppose that 20% of all applicants
are minorities and that only 15% of the persons hired are from minority groups. Is this
difference important and systematic or is it random? Suppose the ratios are 25% and
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Use of this standard may be justified by the limited fore-
sight an employer enjoys when instituting an employment pol-
icy. Without benefit of hindsight, the employer confronted with
several alternative policies having nearly identical projected
discriminatory effects frequently cannot determine which pol-
icy will have the least discriminatory impact. After implement-
ing one policy, it may turn out that one of the alternatives
would have had a slightly less disproportionate effect. The
employer had no way of knowing this without actually imple-
menting one of the alternative policies. Indeed, the difference
in effect may fall within the anticipated interval of statistical
error projected at the time the practice was initiated2 An em-
ployer's Title VII liability should not depend upon such fortui-
ties.
A second, more exacting standard for measuring alterna-
tive practice descends from the Supreme Court comments
about manifest relationship and business necessity. 0 This
theory requires employers to choose the practices having the
least possible discriminatory effect. Under this standard, Title
VII liability is established if the proposed alternative practice
serves the legitimate needs of the employer and is in the slight-
est degree less discriminatory." This means that the alterna-
tive practice does not have to result in a significant reduction
in discriminatory impact, but merely a marginal improvement,
in order to generate liability.2 This standard is a natural exten-
sion of the demanding attitude taken by the courts when evalu-
ating an employer's justification for policies which are shown
10%, respectively? 50% and 0%? Statistical significance determines precisely where theline is drawn for a given level of reliability. See H. BRUNK, MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS
250-58 (1965); H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 122-28 (1960). Courts have almost always
adopted a 95% level of reliability or statistical significance when determining dispro-
portionate effect. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 430 (1975). That is, the
relationship between the variables could have occurred by chance only five times or
less in a hundred trials. Id.
39. Suppose policy A is estimated to be 36% J- 3% unequal and policy B is
estimated to be 37% ± 3% unequal. Upon implementing policy A, a rate of 36.8%disproportionate impact is found to exist, but that policy B would discriminate only
at 36.5%. Policy B is less discriminatory than policy A, but given the projected error,
this difference cannot be detected without actually using one of the policies. See
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 450 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting in
part).
40. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). For subsequent appellate
cases interpreting the Griggs language, see cases cited note 32 supra.
41. United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364 (8th Cir. 1973).
42. Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1171 (5th Cir. 1976); Rowe v.
General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 354 (5th Cir. 1972).
1977]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
to be prima facie discriminatory. 3 In view of Title VII's aim of
eradicating all barriers to employment based upon racial or
other discrimination, it may follow that a slightly less discrimi-
natory alternative fulfilling the same business purpose as an
existing policy should suffice to establish liability.
Furthermore, such a standard would place considerable
pressure upon employers to assiduously analyze their employ-
ment policies for discriminatory impact prior to the advent of
litigation." All possible substitute practices would have to be
determined and their relative effects measured. Slight differ-
ences in discriminatory effect would have to be taken into ac-
count when selecting among them for actual use. The em-
ployer's greater access to information about employment poli-
cies and their varying impact upon job applicants may justify
this increased burden upon its selection among alternatives.
5
The public policy of prohibiting all employment discrimination
in any form further supports the use of this more stringent
standard.
These two suggested standards are not necessarily mu-
tually contradictory or mutually exclusive. It may be that the
employer has a duty to utilize employment practices which
have the least possible disproportionate effect, while complain-
ants must show a violation of this duty by demonstrating the
existence of an alternative practice which has a significantly
less disproportionate effect.
THE DEMISE OF THE EFFECTS TEST AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD
Although use of the effects test is well established law
under Title VII, its use as a rule of constitutional law remained
43. See note 32 supra.
44. Fasman & Clark, Nondiscriminatory Discriminaton: An Overview of the Dis-
crimination Problem, 26 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 129 (1973); Fastiff, Equal Employment
Laws-An Employer's Dilemma, 8 LINCOLN L. Rlv. 125 (1973); Kilberg, Progress and
Problems in Equal Employment Opportunity, 24 LAB. L.J. 651 (1973); Pope, Practicing
Equal Employment Opportinity Law on Behalf of an Employer: An Overview, 61 Ky.
L. REV. 879 (1973); Schrader, Title VII: An Overview of Some Common Employer
Pitfalls, 23 CLEV. ST. L. Rzv. 245 (1974); Symposium-In Pursuit of Fair Employment,
5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. Rav. 261 (1973); Employment Discrimination: A Title VII
Symposium, 34 LA. L. Rav. 540 (1974); Comment, The Georgia Power Case: Another
Federal Agency Comes of Age, or, "My God! Our Employer-Client's Testing Practices
Are Being Challenged by the EEOC?!", 57 MARQ. L. Rav. 515 (1974); Comment, First
Decade of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Past Developments and Future Trends, 20
ST. Louis U.L.J. 219 (1976).
45. Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 527 (6th Cir. 1976).
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unsettled for several years. Some constitutional cases," includ-
ing cases relating to employment discrimination,"7 rely upon
disproportionate impact to uphold findings of racial discrimi-
nation. The United States Supreme Court resolved the issue in
1976 by proscribing the nonevidentiary use of disparate impact
in constitutional analysis. In so doing, the Court drew a sharp
distinction between the constitutional and statutory standards
for measuring discrimination.
In Washington v. Davis, s unsuccessful minority appli-
cants for employment as police officers in the District of Col-
umbia challenged the validity of a personnel test used in hir-
ing. The applicants did not rely on Title VII,1" but simply
argued that the practice of using the personnel test violated
their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.50 Al-
though the Court found the test had an adverse impact upon
minority applicants, it held that the effects test was inapplica-
ble: "We have never held that the constitutional standard for
adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identi-
cal to the standards applicable under Title VII, and decline to
do so today.""
In departing from the analysis of Title VII, the Court em-
phasized the additional element of the plaintiff's case neces-
sary to show a constitutional violation-proof that the dispar-
ate impact was caused by the invidious intent of the employer.
Thus, disparate impact standing alone does not generate a con-
stitutional violation. It merely furnishes evidence from which
a court may infer discriminatory intent.5" In Davis, no discrimi-
natory intent was shown, and the facially neutral employment
practice survived, notwithstanding its adverse impact on mi-
norities.53
46. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1$86).
47. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Anthony v. Massa-
chusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976).
48. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
49. Public employees were not at that time covered by Title VII. See 426 U.S.
at 236 n.6.
50. Since the case involved a federal employer, the plaintiff's constitutional
claim was brought under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. This clausehas been interpreted to contain an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
51. 426 U.S. at 238.
52. Id. at 239. The Court said: "Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose
may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact . ..
that the law bears more heavily on one race than another." Id.
53. Id. at 242. Instead, the Court ruled that a facially neutral test need only be
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In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,54 the Court again drew the Davis distinc-
tion. Here, minority plaintiffs charged that the defendant vil-
lage's refusal to rezone to permit construction of low and mod-
erate income housing constituted racial discrimination prohib-
ited by the fourteenth amendment and the Fair Housing Act
of 1968.11 The plaintiffs contended that the denial of the rezon-
ing had a disproportionate impact on black people, regardless
of the village's underlying motive.
The Court again found that evidence of disproportionate
impact was relevant to the issue of discriminatory intent, but
noted that it did not by itself indicate a constitutional viola-
tion." Since the plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of
showing a discriminatory purpose, the Court dismissed the
constitutional claim. 7
The distinction between constitutional and statutory stan-
dards, only recently underscored by the Court in the area of
discrimination, has been clouded somewhat by language found
"rationally related" to a proper governmental purpose. The rational basis standard has
long been used in equal protection litigation. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971). In contrast, a legislative classification expressly based upon grounds which are
not neutral on their face is subject to "strict scrutiny." See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality) (sex based classification); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 84 (1964)(racial classification). Under the rational basis standard, the Davis
Court held that the plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination.
No intent to discriminate was asserted, the test was neutral on its face, and its use
was deemed "positively" related to performance in the police training course.
54. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970). The suburb was inhabited entirely by whites,
while any public housing project would have been heavily integrated.
56. The Court said:
The impact of the official action . . . may provide an important starting
point [in ascertaining discriminatory purpose]. Sometimes a clear pat-
tern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect
of State action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its
face. The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases are
rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in [Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960)] or [Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)] impact
alone is not determinative and the Court must look to other evidence.
429 U.S. at 266 (footnotes omitted).
57. Significantly, the Court remanded the claim under the Fair Housing Act for
a determination of whether this statutory theory also requires proof of intent. Id. at
506. On remand, the Seventh Cir~uit held that a Fair Housing violation can be estab-
lished by effect without a showing of discriminatory intent, but that racially disparate
impact alone does not establish a per se violation. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). For the possible extension
of the effects test to fair housing cases, see notes 95-145 and accompanying text infra.
19771 EFFECTS TEST
in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. 58 There the Court stated that
its decisions interpreting the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment were a "useful starting point" in inter-
preting the word "discrimination" under Title VII.59 The mean-
ing of this rather startling dictum cannot now be determined.8 °
One thing is certain, however. Although the Gilbert language
blurs the distinction drawn in Davis and Arlington Heights, it
does not question the holdings of those cases-that the effects
test cannot be used as a constitutional measure of discrimina-
tion.
The holdings in Davis and Arlington Heights will impede
efforts to remedy harm suffered by minority groups because of
the discriminatory barriers found in all segments of society.
These cases limit the availability of legal redress for any non-
statutory cause of action, forcing minorities to find a statutory
basis for relief when relying solely on disparate impact to prove
discrimination. In the absence of statutory causes of action,
injured classes of plaintiffs must prove invidious intent, a
showing which is frequently described as very difficult.
Against the restrictive constitutional backdrop, however,
the statutory schemes requiring the use of the effects test are
58. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Gilbert was a Title VII class action in which female
plaintiffs sought to prove that the employer's exclusion from benefits coverage of
temporary disability resulting from pregnancy constituted sex discrimination. The
Court held against them, concluding that when the benefits package was viewed in its
entirety, it was impossible to find in it any gender-based discriminatory effect. Id. at
138-40.
59. Id. at 133. The Court reasoned as follows: "Particularly in the case of defining
the term 'discrimination,' which Congress has nowhere in Title VII defined, these cases
afford an existing body of law analyzing and discussing that term in a legal context
not wholly dissimilar from the concerns which Congress manifested in enacting Title
VII." Id.
60. If the constitutional standard of discrimination is now relevant in interpret-
ing Title VII, the Gilbert language implicitly questions the continuing validity of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Prior to Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976), many had hoped to see the Court incorporate the Griggs effects test into
constitutional analysis. Instead, Gilbert may imply that the deferential approach of
constitutional adjudication will be used to interpret Title VII. This ironic blow to civil
rights advocates will probably not occur with the present Court, however. Two concur-
ring justices and two dissenters in Gilbert made clear that Griggs is still good law.
Justice Brennan stated his reasons most strongly:
[It is unacceptable] that the Fourteenth Amendment standard of dis-
crimination is coterminous with that applicable to Title VII. Not only is
[the majority's] fleeting dictum irrelevant to the reasoning that pre-
ceded it, not only does it conflict with a long line of cases to the contrary
• . . but it is flatly contradicted by the central holding of last Term's
Washington v. Davis. . ..
429 U.S. at 153 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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increasing. This trend is due partly to express congressional
intent and partly to judicial interpretation.6 Thus, despite the
setbacks suffered by civil rights advocates in the constitutional
arena, it seems clear that the effects test can be used as a
standard for proving discrimination in employment, lending,
housing, and possibly other areas.2
STATUTORY EXPANSION
The apparent demise of the effects test in the constitu-
tional arena has obscured the fact that it continues to play a
key role under Title VII. More importantly, its use is expanding
to other areas of discrimination. In particular, additional de-
velopment has begun under the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act 3 and under the Fair Housing Act. 4
Credit Discrimination
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), which be-
came effective in October of 1975,65 prohibited creditors from
discriminating against any applicant on the basis of sex or
marital status with respect to any aspect of a credit transac-
tion."8 Due to its limited antidiscriminaton scope, this statute
was initially viewed more as a consumer credit law than as a
civil rights act. 7
In 1976, Congress substantially expanded the ECOA's
scope to also prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, age, receipt of public assistance, and
the good faith exercise of Consumer Credit Protection Act
61. Lower federal courts have generally interpreted antidiscrimination legisla-
tion in a liberal manner. See Blumrosen, supra note 11, at 63.
62. See id., where the author asserts: "It is more important, today, that we be
more concerned about the broad and practical implementation of [civil] rights than
about their constitutional foundation."
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (Supp. VI 1976).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title VIII].
65. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 707, 88 Stat. 1525
(1974).
66. The ECOA was enacted in response to the difficulties which single women
encountered in obtaining credit, the practice of considering only the husband's charac-
teristics when married persons applied for credit, and the problems of widowed and
divorced women in reestablishing credit. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE,
CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 152 (1972), reprinted in CCH INSTALLMENT
CREDIT GUIDE No. 215 (1973).
67. Geary, Equal Credit Opportunity-An Analysis of Regulation B, 31 Bus.
LAW. 1641 (1976); Lyckman, The 1976 Amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, 28 BAYLOR L.REv. 633 (1976).
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rights. 8 The 1976 amendments were a natural extension of the
coverage of the existing Act. They also made the ECOA more
like existing civil rights laws.69 Consequently, the text of the
ECOA has at least a generic resemblance to the text of other
equal opportunity statutes. 0
When elevating the ECOA to the status of a full coverage
civil rights law, Congress expressed almost as an aside, its in-
tent that the effects test apply to credit discrimination."' The
Senate report accompanying the amendments, in discussing
the general prohibition of credit discrimination contained in
section 701(a)7" of the ECOA, states: "In determining the exist-
ence of discrimination 
. . . courts or agencies are free to look
at the effects of a creditor's practices as well as the creditor's
motives or conduct in individual transactions."7" The report
expressly states that the judicial construction of other anti-
discrimination legislation is "intended to serve as guides in the
application of this Act."74 The House report accompanying the
amendments also endorses the use of the effects test in the
credit field.75 The Federal Reserve Board, which is authorized
to promulgate regulations to carry out the purposes of the
ECOA,76 has also sanctioned the use of the test.7
The legislative history of the ECOA does not make clear
whether the effects test as applied to credit discrimination is
68. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, §
701, 90 Stat. 251 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. VI 1976)). The Consumer Credit
Protection Act, which includes the ECOA, is codified in 15 U.S.C. 99 1614-1691f
(Supp. VI 1976).
69. S. CONF. REP. No. 685, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H. CONF. REP. No. 873,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 427,427; S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 403, 404; H. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975).
70. See, e.g., National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 17 01-1750g (1970) (nondiscri-
mination in mortgage assistance); Equal Educational Opportunity Act, 20 U.S.C. §§1701-1758 (Supp. IV 1974); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1970) (Title VI) (nondiscri-
mination in federally assisted programs); Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42U.S.C. 99 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970)(Title VII); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3631 (1970) (Title VIII).
71. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976), reprinted in [1976 U.S.CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 403, 406; H. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975).
72. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, §
701(a), 90 Stat. 251 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (Supp. VI 1976)).
73. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976), reprinted in [1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 403, 406.
74. Id.
75. H. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a) (Supp. VI 1976).
77. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(a) n.7 (1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 1242 (1977).
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essentially the same as the effects test applied to employment
discrimination. It is not even certain, for example, that the
credit test employs a three step process with each step operat-
ing to shift the burden of persuasion. The employment test
may serve merely as a guide in the development of a new and
independent credit effects test."8
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, study of the nature
of credit discrimination and of the Title VII effects test permits
the formulation of a preliminary statement of the credit effects
test. In view of the absence of case law," the discussion is
necessarily speculative. Nevertheless, one can understand how
the credit effects test will operate by analogizing to the ele-
ments of the effects test in the employment field. In consider-
ing this formulation, the reader must recall the factual differ-
ences between the normal operational procedures in the fields
of employment and credit extension, as well as in the types of
discrimination found in each field.
The prima facie case. Generally speaking, the discussion
of the plaintiff-class' prima facie case under the employment
effects test ° should apply to its counterpart in credit. Thus, a
credit practice which is neutral on its face may be discrimina-
tory if shown to have a disparate impact upon a protected class.
In addition, although the suit is triggered by a single act, the
test will relate to a series of incidents constituting a discrimina-
tory credit practice. Finally, a party claiming redress under the
credit effects test must show only injury and membership in
the aggrieved class. Proof of a causal relationship between the
discriminatory credit practice and the individual's damages
can be attenuated and indirect.
The principle difference between the respective prima
facie cases involves the classes protected by each statute. The
protected classes described in the ECOA are much broader
78. It is also unclear whether the credit effects test is derived solely from employ-
ment cases existing on the effective date of the ECOA, or whether future judicial
changes in the employment case law are to be automatically reflected in credit discrim-
ination decisions.
79. To date only a few cases have been filed under the ECOA. See Wilkes v.
Montgomery Ward, Inc., Civ. No. 76 C 3376 (N.D. Ill. filed 1976); In re Marcor, Inc. 5
CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,299 (F.T.C. Nov. 23, 1976); Harrell v. Richmond News-
papers Fed. Credit Union, Richmond Times Dispatch, Jan. 15, 1977. Since the most
important of the recent amendments to the ECOA, see note 68 and accompanying text
supra, did not take effect until March 23, 1977, see Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 707, 90 Stat. 255, none of the cases uses
the disparate impact theory.
80. See text accompanying notes 20-29 supra.
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than those covered by Title VII. Among the categories pro-
tected by the ECOA and not protected by Title VII are marital
status,' age, receipt of public assistance, and good faith exer-
cise of Consumer Credit Protection Act rights.2
By analogy to its employment ancestor, the credit effects
test appears to require a showing of disparate impact. If ad-
verse action, a term of art, occurs at higher rates for a protected
class or there is disproportionate lending at statistically signifi-
cant rates, this should suffice to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the credit effects test. 3 The House report
impliedly supports this conclusion by stating that population
statistics evidencing a disparate lending practice may be used
to establish a prima facie effects test case."4
The relative access of the litigants to pertinent credit in-
formation supports this conclusion."s The complainant in a
credit denial case is usually in a position to estimate whether
a protected class is being refused credit more often than others,
but cannot determine whether this action relates to creditwor-
thiness. Creditworthiness depends upon proprietal information
in the possession of the creditor."0 Accordingly, it may be ap-
propriate to deem a showing of disproportionate credit denials
as a prima facie effects test case, and then leave it to the
81. Marital status has occasionally been a Title VII issue. Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Guse v. J.C.
Penny Co., 409 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Wis. 1976). Contra, Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. VI 1976); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(z)(1977); 42 Fed. Reg.
1242 (1977).
83. "Adverse action" is a term which has been defined to encompass all manner
of credit refusals, changes, revocations, and denials in which a credit decision is made.
15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6) (Supp. VI 1976); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c) (1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 1242
(1977).
84. The House report, in referring to an ECOA provision (subsequently droppedfrom the enacted version) which held that a showing of disproportionate lending did
not constitute a per se violation of the ECOA, said that this provision was not intended
to limit judicial use of population statistics in accordance with the effects test. H. REP.
No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975).
85. Accord, Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1976); Watkins v.
Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1976); Chicano Police Officers Ass'n v. Stover,
526 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1975).
86. Determining creditworthiness is, however, a much less subjective decision
than estimating employment qualifications. In addition, the validity of the creditor's
practices can be checked by statistical analysis of default rates. This exercise usually
cannot be undertaken in employment situations because of the smaller number of
decisions involved and the uncertainty about what constitutes good job performance.
Accordingly, the credit effects test may properly involve a simpler prima facie showing
than its employment counterpart.
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creditor to rebut by showing that the statistical disparity is
actually related to creditworthiness. 7
Finally, under the credit effects test, evidence of dispro-
portionate extension of credit should not be regarded as a per
se violation of the ECOA. 5 It is the policy of the ECOA to
consider each applicant on the basis of his or her own credit-
worthiness, and not upon assumptions about characteristics of
demographic classes of which the applicant is a member. 9 If
evidence of disproportionate extension were a per se violation,
then creditors might feel compelled to make unsound loans to
uncreditworthy applicants in order to avoid a statistical dispar-
ity. This was not the congressional intent.9 0 The ECOA merely
obligates creditors to ignore prohibited bases when evaluating
creditworthiness and granting credit.
Creditor's rebuttal. The creditor may rebut the prima facie
case by demonstrating that it is the creditor's customary proce-
dure to use the challenged credit practice for all extentions of
credit of the amount and type applied for, and that the credit
practice has a manifest relationship to creditworthiness or
other legitimate business purpose.' This rebuttal should be
nearly identical to its employment counterpart. "Manifest re-
lationship" is again a term charged with uncertain meaning.
Usually, the creditor will seek to show that the challenged
credit practice is necessary to determine creditworthiness.
Where the creditor invariably uses the credit practice in ques-
tion, its relationship to creditworthiness can be determined by
87. The characteristics of applicants will vary greatly from creditor to creditor.
Main, A New Way to Score with Lenders, MONEY, Feb. 1977, at 73, 74; Letter from
Richard A. Kerr, Operating Vice President, Federated Stores, to Neil Butler, Section
Chief, Equal Credit Opportunity Section, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Dec. 9, 1976). Intuitively the credit customers of Tiffany's are different from
those of K Mart. Accordingly, disproportionate lending should be measured against
the population consisting of the creditor's applicants rather than the population of the
surrounding geographical area. The comparison population used in employment cases
is more geographic, because of the more homogeneous nature of potential employment
applicants. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
88. Notwithstanding that the House report's statement to this effect referred to
a provision which was dropped from the final version of the ECOA. See note 84 supra.
89. H. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1975).
90. S. REP. No. 1388, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1976); S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1976), reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 403, 406.
91. See 41 Fed. Reg. 49,135 n.6 (1976), a preliminary draft of Regulation B,
interpreting the ECOA.
Note that creditors tend to process all applicants using a uniform procedure. This
computer imposed standardization should obviate the need for plaintiffs to use the
class action form. The nature of credit analysis is such that a pattern or practice of
using the challenged policy can simply be assumed.
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use of statistics which associate default rates with certain ap-
plicant characteristics and by empirical analysis of defaulted
loans.2
Less discriminatory alternatives. It remains open to the
plaintiff-class to prove that another credit practice will have
less undesirable discriminatory effects on the protected class
and will serve the creditor's legitimate needs at least as well as
the existing credit practice. 3 This step parallels its employ-
ment counterpart in not specifying the degree by which dis-
crimination must be reduced under an alternative practice in
order to cause effects test liability. In addition, no guidance is
offered as to how much effort the creditor should use to discover
the alternative prior to instituting the practice. Finally, it is
uncertain whether the plaintiff-class will prevail if the prof-
fered alternative is so expensive or difficult to use or discover
that its implementation is rendered impractical."
Housing Discrimination
The use of the effects test in Title VII cases was authorized
by decisions of the Supreme Court. Courts using the effects test
under the ECOA will draw their authorization from the legisla-
tive history surrounding the Act. At present, no penultimate
legal authority has authorized the use of the effects test under
Title VIII, the Fair Housing Act.9" Notwithstanding the ab-
sence of superior legal sanction, federal courts have moved to
rapidly incorporate the effects test into their Title VIII rulings
in connection with at least four potentially discriminatory
housing practices: zoning, refusals to deal, placement of public
housing, and redlining.
Zoning practices. The most controversial area of Title VIII
litigation involves unintentional discrimination which results
from the zoning practices of local authorities. Some cases use
disparate impact as evidence of discriminatory intent on the
part of zoning authorities." Other courts, by way of dicta, have
92. Memorandum from Edward M. Lewis, Fair, Isaac & Co., to Neil Butler,
Equal Credit Opportunity Section, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Oct. 22, 1976).
93. Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)(employment
discrimination).
94. See generally notes 36-45 and accompanying text supra.
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970).
96. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1292 (7th Cir. 1977).
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supported the proposition that the effects test applies in these
types of zoning cases,97 but the issue is far from settled.
The Supreme Court has recently shown an apparent will-
ingness to give this issue serious consideration. In Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.," the Court rejected a constitutional claim of discrimina-
tion based on the disproportionate impact of a zoning prac-
tice.9 The Court remanded, however, with instructions to con-
sider the question of whether the effects test applied to a simi-
lar claim under Title VIII.'00 Upon reconsideration, the appel-
late court held that a Title VIII case can be established, at least
under some circumstances without recourse to proving impro-
per intent. 10 Conversely, proof of disparate impact alone is not
a per se violation of Title VIII.
In the wake of Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court also
vacated a Sixth Circuit decision, Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City
of Toledo, 02 which had held by implication that the effects test
cannot be used under Title VIII. In Skillken the trial court
found that city authorities were motivated by discriminatory
purposes in refusing to rezone certain areas to permit construc-
tion of low rent housing projects. 13 It concluded, however, that
motivation was immaterial to a finding of discrimination."4 On
97. The line of zoning cases reported under Title VIII by lower federal courts
appears at first blush to fully embrace the effects test. United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United Farm
Workers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir.
1974); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970)(42 U.S.C. § 1983); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City
of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970)(fourteenth amendment). The opinions
contain comforting quotations for the advocate desiring to use disproportionate effect
as the main proof of discriminatory zoning under Title VIII. E.g., United States v. City
of Black Jack, supra (showing of disparate impact suffices for prima facie case, shifting
burden of justification to defendant). All of these decisions, however, actually involve
intentional discrimination in zoning. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack,
372 F.Supp. 319, 322-25 (E.D. Mo. 1974). The judicial displeasure with the effects of
exclusionary zoning practices has been largely admonitionary.
98. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
99. See note 56 and text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
100. 429 U.S. at 271.
101. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977). Accord, Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 46 U.S.L.W.
2143, 2143 (3d Cir., Aug. 31, 1977) (dictum).
102. 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated & remanded, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977).
103. 380 F. Supp. 228, 231 (N.D. Ohio 1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975),
vacated & remanded, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977).
104. The court said: "The courts will look beyond the form of a transaction to
its substance and proscribe practices which actually or predictively result in racial
discrimination irrespective of the defendant's motivation." Id. at 233, quoting Wil-
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appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed,'05 finding that the city offi-
cials did not have discriminatory motives when refusing the
rezoning request.'"6 In the absence of discriminatory intent, the
court held that there was no constitutional violation.'"' The
court mentioned but did not discuss the Title VIII claims. Ap-
parently, it either concluded that the Title VIII claims were
dependent upon the constitutional claim or it used constitu-
tional standards to resolve the statutory issues. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded
to the court of appeals "for further consideration in light of
[Village of Arlington Heights].""
It is difficult to state the implications of these develop-
ments. However, when the language of Arlington Heights is
viewed in conjunction with the vacation of Skillken, it can
probably be said that the Court is seeking to draw a firm linebetween constitutional and statutory claims of discrimination.
Although it has rejected the use of the effects test as a constitu-
tional standard, it may well adopt it as a statutory standard
under Title VIII as well as Title VII. In vacating Skillken,
which rejected the test as a statutory standard, the Court dem-
onstrated a possible willingness to adopt the test under Title
VIII.
Refusals to sell or rent. Title VIII prohibits "discrimina-
tion" in the sale or rental of housing.09 It does not define
discrimination.11 A minor provision of Title VIII gives theAttorney General power to intervene where a "pattern or prac-
tice" of housing discrimination develops."' When construing
liams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974).
The court endorsed the concept of the prima facie case under Title VIII and statedthat it operates to shift the burden of justification to the defendants. 380 F. Supp. at
234.
105. 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated & remanded, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977).106. Id. at 876. The court concluded that the city officials were merely intending
to protect property values. Id. at 881.
107. The court spoke in terms of using the rational basis test in lieu of the
compelling interest test. Id. at 879. Under this standard, the fact that minority resi-dents were concentrated in certain areas of the city was not deemed proof of officialdiscrimination. The court supported its validation of facially neutral policies having
unequal impact with citations to constitutional cases.
108. 429 U.S. 1068 (1977). The case was also remanded in light of Hills v. Gau-
treaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). See text accompanying note 138 infra.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1970).
110. It does, however, define "discriminatory housing practice" in a general way.
Id. § 3602(f).
111. Id. § 3613. It is of interest to observe that Title VII refers generally to
"unlawful employment practices," including discrimination with respect to employ-
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this provision, federal courts have held that a discriminatory
pattern or practice standing alone is sufficient to trigger
federal intervention."' The practice need not be shown to be
intentional or motivated by discriminatory purposes."' Thus,
discrimination in Title VIII has been interpreted to bar not
only intentional discrimination, but also practices which pro-
duce discriminatory results,"' and good faith will be an inade-
quate defense when such discriminatory effects are shown."'
Subsequent opinions"' have transferred the definition of
discrimination as disparate impact from the federal interven-
tion section to cases brought by individuals under section
804,"7 a general Title VIII provision which prohibits discrimi-
nation in the sale or rental of housing.
Thus, in Williams v. Matthews Co.,"' the Eighth Circuit
found Title VIII's proscription on practices which resulted in
discrimination, irrespective of the defendant's motives, persu-
asive in an individual action brought partly under 804. Wil-
liams, a minority group member, had attempted to purchase
one of the defendant-developer's lots in a development con-
fined to white residents only. The developer employed a restric-
tive sales practice- that of selling only to "approved" build-
ers."' The court concluded that this practice "operated to ex-
clude black persons from acquiring building lots in the real
ment, whereas Title VIII mentions pattern or practice only in connection with federal
intervention. Judicial attacks on housing discrimination have elected to ignore this
critical difference in language when citing employment cases in support of a housing
effects test.
112. United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
113. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
934 (1972).
114. United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United
States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 782 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
115. United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544, 548 (W.D. Va.
1975); United States v. Reddock, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING (P-H) 13,569, at
13,778 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd, 467 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972).
116. E.g., Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1183 (N.D. Ohio 1972). These
opinions are also noteworthy in that it is not necessary to proceed as a class action in
order to assert the housing effects test. This may be attributable to its diversified origin
in many unrelated opinions. Alternately, the limited impact of certain types of housing
discrimination, such as a refusal to deal, may compel use of the individual form of
action. Rarely will enough members of a protected class have sought to purchase a
particular house so that they can properly claim that joinder is impossible, as required
by FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
117. Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970).
118. 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
119. Id. at 826.
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estate subdivision."''2 Thus, said the court, this facially neutral
practice could not stand if it operated to discriminate on the
basis of race.'2'
Since it pre-dated International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States, "2 Williams failed to distinguish the disparate
impact theory of discrimination from the disparate treatment
theory. 3 In spite of the sweeping language used by the court,
the actual holding appears to have been based upon the une-
qual treatment to which the plaintiff was subjected. 2 ' The
court outlined a three step process for analyzing cases of hous-
ing discrimination, but interlaced elements of both theories
into the various steps. 2 5
Adding to the confusion about refusals to deal are cases
such as Boyd v. Lefrak Organization,121 in which the Second
Circuit reversed a lower court decision which had incorporated
the effects test of the employment discrimination field within
the area of housing discrimination. ,7 Boyd, a renter, was re-
quired to maintain a minimum weekly net income in order to
qualify for tenancy. The district court observed that this re-
quirement had the effect of excluding all welfare recipients,
the vast majority of whom were minority group members. 2 1
120. Id. at 823.
121. Id. at 828, citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
122. 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977).
123. See notes 6-12 and accompanying text supra.
124. The plaintiff's attempt to purchase a lot had been put through a "special
handling" process-that is, it was handled separately from offers tendered by whites.
499 F.2d at 827. Although the appellate court formally accepted the district court's
finding that this procedure was not motivated by a discriminatory purpose, it is clear
from the opinion that the appellate court gave little credence to this finding. The court
concluded that the practice carried with it racial overtones. Id. at 828.
In addition to this indication of unequal treatment, the court's description of the
prima facie case was phrased in terms of unequal treatment. See id. at 826. Further,
the court relied upon McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a
disparate treatment case, for its discussion of the prima facie case and of the seller's
rebuttal. See 499 F.2d at 826-27.
125. See note 124 supra. One other peculiarity may be noted in the court's
formulation. The court said that it would disallow any business necessity justification
for a restrictive selling practice unless the seller also demonstrated the absence of any
alternative practices which were less discriminatory in effect. 499 F.2d at 828. This
novel prerequisite to the business necessity defense has not been endorsed in Title VII
case law. But cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1974) (endorsed by EEOC under Title VII).
126. 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1974) (2-1), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975).
127. Id. at 1114-15.
128. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSINo (P-H) 13,650 at 14,243 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1974).
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It concluded that this disproportionate impact constituted a
violation of Title VIII.' 25
On appeal, the Second Circuit held the disparate impact
theory inapplicable to Title VIII.'3 ° It did so based on relatively
unsound reasoning'3 ' and over a strong dissent.' 2 Although a
petition for rehearing en banc was denied, four judges went on
record as favoring the application of the effects test to Title
VIII actions.'33
It is interesting to observe that cases involving intentional
refusals to deal are becoming increasingly rare. Either refusals
to deal have become more covert, a situation which will compel
more frequent resort to the disparate impact theory,"' or refus-
als to deal are actually becoming less common, indicating that
Title VIII has been successful in this area.
129. Id., citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). In conjunc-
tion with its findings of disproportionate impact, the district court found that the
minimum weekly income requirement did not accurately measure rent paying ability
and was thus not justified on grounds of business necessity. Id. at 14,242.
130. 509 F.2d at 1114. In reversing, the court of appeals also rejected the district
court's equating of race with economic status. The minimum weekly income require-
ment, it said, affected all poor people and not merely racial minorities or welfare
recipients. Moreover, the court found that the percentage of defendant's minority
tenants fairly reflected the percentage of minority members in the local population.
Id. at 1113.
131. Id. at 1114. The court cited Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 n.19
(1972), a constitutional decision, for the proposition that the effects test did not apply
to Title VIII.
In Jefferson, recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) chal-
lenged the allocation of a fixed pool of funds among four public assistance programs
as having an unequal effect upon minority group members in contravention of Title
VI, which requires nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs. See 42 U.S.C. §§
2000d to 2000d-4 (1970). The Court rejected application of Griggs, ruling that the
variation in composition of the programs was rationally related to the various purposes
of the separate programs. 406 U.S. at 449 n.19.
Jefferson's constitutional basis makes it questionable authority for the statutory
issue presented in Boyd. See generally notes 46-57 and accompanying text supra.
132. 509 F.2d at 1115 (Mansfield, C.J., dissenting)(urging the adoption of Griggs
and suggesting in detail how the disparate impact theory's burden of proof would
operate in the area of housing discrimination).
133. 517 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1975). A majority of the Second Circuit judges avail-
able voted for rehearing, but because of judicial vacancies or absences, a majority of
judges authorized to sit on the circuit did not. See FED. R. App. P. 35(a).
134. For cases that have already applied the disparate impact theory to Title
VIII, see Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 n.6 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1021 (1974); United States v. L & H Land Corp., 407 F. Supp. 576, 579 (S.D.
Fla. 1976); United States v. Long, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING (P-H) 13,631, at
14,090 (C.D.S.C. 1974), modified, id. 13,733 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Youri-
tan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1973), modified, 509 F.2d 623 (9th
Cir. 1975). See also Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Mansfield, C.J., dissenting).
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Public housing. A few decisions have used the effects test
to attack the placement of public housing projects. Generally,
these cases charge that "scatter site" housing would be more
desirable, and that placing additional public housing in minor-
ity neighborhoods has the effect of perpetuating discrimina-
tion. '" These suits have usually been brought on constitutional
grounds, rather than under Title VIII. 13B
These constitutional attacks relying on the effects test
have not fared well in the courts. Although they antedated the
Davis holding, these cases anticipated its distinction between
discrimination for constitutional purposes and statutory pur-
poses.' 7 Further, the constitutionality of the Court's ability to
force the placement of public housing is limited in some cases
by its lack of power to shape intermunicipal remedies. 3 '
In addition, some public housing location cases have not
fared well under a statutory cause of action either. Courts have
generally stated that something more than just a discrimina-
tory impact is required to make out a prima facie case under
Title VIII. 135
Redlining. The final area in which Title VIII litigation uses
the disparate impact theory is redlining, a practice whereby
mortgage lenders specify certain areas in which mortgage loans
will not be made, or made only at very unfavorable terms.4 0
135. Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir.
1974); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972). In an indirect sense,
Arlington Heights is a siting as well as a zoning case.
136. Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974); Norwalk CORE
v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
137. Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078, 1082 (2d Cir. 1974).
138. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
139. Id. at 1068 n.5. Contra, Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arling-
ton Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
140. Fefferman, The Redlining of Neighborhoods By Mortgage Lending Institu-
tions and What Can Be Done About It, in REDLINING, FED. NAT'L MORTGAGE ASS'N
SPECIAL REP. (1976); Hood & Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation and
Urban Decay: Neighborhood Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, in 7 URBAN
LAW 510 (1975); Nelson, Some Perspectives on Redlining, in REDLINiNG, FED. NAT'L
MORTGAGE ASs'N SPECIAL REP. (1976); Renne, Eliminating Redlining by Judicial Ac-
tion: Are Erasers Available?, 29 VAND. L. REV. 987 (1976); Note, Redlining-The Fight
Against Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 6 Loy. U.L.J. 71 (1975); Note, Mortgage
Discrimination: Eliminating Racial Discrimination in Home Financing Through the
Fair Housing Act of 1968, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 139 (1975).
More recently, redlining has also encompassed geographic limitations imposed
upon distribution of credit cards. Stuart, 'Redlining' Charged in Denial of Credit toDetroit Couple, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1977, at 19, col. 1; 'Redlining with Credit
Cards, Wash. Post, July 20, 1977 at A22, col. 1; Letter from Senator Donald W. Riegle,
Jr., to the Washington Post (July 31, 1977).
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The lender takes this action because it anticipates that the
neighborhood will decay, change racially, or otherwise become
undesirable. When lenders adopt such a policy, the decline of
the neighborhood often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Recent federal cases have tentatively ruled that such prac-
tices violate Title VIII. 4M ' In Laufman v. Oakley Building Co., 142
for example, the court stopped just short of expressly adopting
the effects test for redlining decisions. The court cited with
approval a federal regulation for savings and loan associations
which prohibits redlining practices because of their discrimina-
tory effects upon protected classes.' It also made express refer-
ence to Griggs. "I This decision indicates that future use of the
effects test to combat redlining is highly probable.
As a result of the contradictory case law under Title VIII,
no definitive statement has yet emerged stating the compo-
nents of the effects test to be utilized under it.'45 This uncer-
tainty stems from the variety of factual patterns of Title VIII
cases, which are less susceptible to ready classification than
their employment counterparts. Nevertheless, additional de-
velopment of the effects test under Title VIII appears very
probable.
CONCLUSION
Although two highly publicized Supreme Court cases have
eliminated hopes of using the effects test as a constitutional
standard in discrimination cases, the same cases reaffirm its
use as a statutory standard. Davis sanctions its application in
Title VII actions, while Arlington Heights can be read to im-
pliedly allow the effects test in Title VIII cases.
As a statutory standard, the effects test continues to ex-
pand its scope. It began as a test for scrutinizing employment
discrimination under Title VII, and Congress subsequently
authorized its use under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
141. Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 414 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ohio
1976).
142. 408 F. Supp. 489, 495 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (summary judgment denied).
143. Id. (discussing 12 C.F.R. § 528.2(d) (1974), as interpreted in a formal opin-
ion of the General Counsel to the Federal Home Loan Bank on March 21, 1974).
144. Id. at 495.
145. Possible formulations appear in Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); Williams v. Matthews Co.,
499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974); Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 380 F. Supp.
228 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
[Vol. 17
EFFECTS TEST
Courts are now exploring its possible application to cases of
housing discrimination under Title VIII. Indeed, there is no
reason to preclude its use to interpret other antidiscrimination
statutes. " '
In fact, it can be persuasively contended that the effects
test is evolving into a generally applicable statutory standard
for testing discrimination. All manner of antidiscrimination
legislation is susceptible to interpretation based on its formula.
This process has already begun. Uses of the effects test in areas
other than employment are not simply coming, they are al-
ready here.
146. See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 817 (3d Cir. 1970) (Title VI),
where the court approved a HUD regulation, see 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(i) (1970), which
required that siting determinations not use criteria having discriminatory effect. See
also Graves v. Romney, 502 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1974) (Title VI); Marin City Counsel
v. Matin County Redev. Agency, 416 F.Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1975)(Title VI) (partial
summary judgment), complaint dismissed, 416 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1976). But see
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976) (Title IX).
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